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Abstract. One of the central logical ideas in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus is
the elimination of the identity sign in favor of the so-called “exclusive interpretation” of names
and quantifiers requiring different names to refer to different objects and (roughly) different
variables to take different values. In this paper, we examine a recent development of these ideas
in papers by Kai Wehmeier. We diagnose two main problems of Wehmeier’s account, the first
concerning the treatment of individual constants, the second concerning so-called “pseudo-
propositions” (Scheinsätze) of classical logic such as a = a or a = b ∧ b = c → a = c. We
argue that overcoming these problems requires two fairly drastic departures from Wehmeier’s
account: (1) Not every formula of classical first-order logic will be translatable into a single
formula ofWittgenstein’s exclusive notation. Instead, therewill often be amultiplicity of possible
translations, revealing the original “inclusive” formulas to be ambiguous. (2) Certain formulas
of first-order logic such as a = a will not be translatable intoWittgenstein’s notation at all, being
thereby revealed as nonsensical pseudo-propositions which should be excluded from a “correct”
conceptual notation. We provide translation procedures from inclusive quantifier-free logic into
the exclusive notation that take these modifications into account and define a notion of logical
equivalence suitable for assessing these translations.
§1. Introduction. One of the central logical ideas inWittgenstein’sTractatus logico-
philosophicus is the elimination of the identity sign from logical notation. At the
time, this idea was taken very seriously, for example by Bertrand Russell and Frank
Ramsey. Russell consideredWittgenstein’s criticism of Principia’s definition of identity
“a destructive criticism from which there seems no escape” (Wittgenstein, 1998,
p. 274) and tried to make amends in Principia’s second edition. Frank Ramsey tried
to incorporate “Wittgenstein’s discovery that the sign of identity is not a necessary
constituent of logical notation” (Ramsey, 1990, p. 194) into his own revision of
Principia’s versionof the foundations ofmathematics. Twoother notable commentators
wereKurtGrelling andFriedrichWaismann.1 But since then, interest has largely faded2
and first-order logic with identity has become standard. In recent years, however,
discussion has picked up again and it could be argued that only with the work of
authors like Juliet Floyd, Kai Wehmeier and Gregory Landini have we moved close
to a full understanding of Wittgenstein’s proposal. In part, this delay seems due to a
reluctance to engage not only with the philosophical aspects of the proposal but also
with the details of its technical execution.
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In this paper we examine what seems to us the most advanced recent development of
Wittgenstein’s identity-free logic, which is given in a series of papers by Kai Wehmeier.
We diagnose two main problems of Wehmeier’s account, the first concerning the
treatment of individual constants (or names), the second concerning so-called “pseudo-
propositions” (Scheinsätze) of classical logic3 such as a = a or a = b∧b = c→ a = c.
We argue that overcoming these problems requires two fairly drastic departures
from Wehmeier’s account: (1) Not every formula of classical first-order logic will
be translatable into a single formula of Wittgenstein’s “exclusive” notation. In many
cases there will instead be a set of possible translations, revealing the original formulas
to be ambiguous in a certain way. (2) Certain formulas of first-order logic such as
a = a will not be translatable into Wittgenstein’s notation at all. These formulas are
thereby revealed as nonsensical pseudo-propositions which should be excluded from
a “correct” conceptual notation. In order to keep the discussion focused on these two
points, our alternative account of Wittgenstein’s exclusive notation in this paper will
be restricted to the fragment of quantifier-free logic (i.e., first-order logic with names
and identity, but without quantifiers).
§2. Wittgenstein’s proposal for the elimination of identity. Wittgenstein’s main
proposal concerning identity in the Tractatus is outlined in remarks 5.53 to 5.5352.
The core of his proposal is stated right at the beginning:4
5.53 Identity of object I express by identity of sign, and not by
using a sign for identity. Difference of objects I express by difference
of signs.
He illustrates this proposal with a couple of examples both for individual constants
and quantifiers.
5.531 Thus I donotwrite ‘f(a,b).a = b’, but ‘f(a,a)’ (or ‘f(b,b)’);
and not ‘f(a,b).∼ a = b’, but ‘f(a,b)’.
5.532 And analogously I do not write ‘(∃x,y).f(x,y).x = y’,
but ‘(∃x).f(x,x)’; and not ‘(∃x,y).f(x,y). ∼ x = y’, but ‘(∃x,y)
.f(x,y)’. (So Russell’s ‘(∃x,y).f(x,y)’ becomes ‘(∃x,y).f(x,y).∨
.(∃x).f(x,x)’.)
Wittgenstein’s convention for individual constants (names) therefore requires a one-
to-one correspondence between individual constants and objects. The convention for
quantifiers requires that under certain circumstances quantifiers are to be interpreted
“exclusively,” i.e., different variables will take different objects as values.5 If carried
out, Wittgenstein’s twin conventions are intended to obviate the need for a sign for
identity.
It may seem puzzling at first that in another cluster of remarks subordinate to 4.42
which deal with names as “simple symbols,” Wittgenstein seems to give the identity
sign a role in logical notation:
3 By “classical logic” wemean first-order predicate logic with identity and the usual “inclusive”
interpretation of quantifiers and constants (see §2 and §3 for the contrast withWittgenstein’s
“exclusive” notation).
4 All English quotes are from the Pears/McGuinness translation.
5 The terminology of “exclusive” vs. “inclusive” interpretations is due to Hintikka (1956, p.
226). Aswewill see, the second convention is ambiguous and has to be definedmore precisely.
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4.241 When I use two signs with one and the same meaning, I
express this by putting the sign ‘=’ between them. So ‘a = b’ means
that the sign ‘b’ can be substituted for the sign ‘a’.
However, it is important to distinguish between identity as a relation between objects
and identity of meaning as a relation between signs. Concerning the first, Wittgenstein
clearly states that “identity is not a relation between objects” (5.5301) because “to say of
two things that they are identical is nonsense, and to say of one thing that it is identical
with itself is to say nothing” (5.5303). Statements expressing sameness of meaning,
on the other hand, are merely “rules dealing with signs” (4.241) or “representational
devices” (4.242). One crucial question for any account of Wittgenstein’s exclusive
notation concerns the interpretation of the identity signs occurring in 5.531 and
following. On our view, these remarks show how identity statements understood as
rules governing the use of signs can be used for eliminating the identity sign from
Russellian notation and it therefore remains true that “the identity sign is not an
essential constituent of conceptual notation” (5.533).
As withmany ofWittgenstein’s doctrines, he apparently wasn’t interested in working
out his proposal for eliminating identity systematically. But there is a very early attempt
to work it out by Frank Ramsey, who reported in his classical paper on the foundations
of mathematics that “the convention is slightly ambiguous, but can be made definite,
and is then workable, although generally inconvenient” (Ramsey, 1990, pp. 194–195).
The details of his account were published in manuscripts edited from his Nachlass
(Ramsey, 1991). In the meantime, Hintikka (1956) seems to have been the only serious
attempt to spell out the proposal. After Hintikka’s canonical paper there has been
little serious discussion of the exclusive interpretation of quantifiers until the issue was
taken up in Floyd (2001), Wehmeier (2004) and Landini (2007).
§3. Wehmeier’s account of the elimination of identity. Since Wittgenstein gives no
explicit set of rules for handling his exclusive quantifiers and names, there is some
leeway in interpreting the intended convention. As Wehmeier convincingly argues, the
so-called “weakly exclusive” interpretation is best positioned both exegetically and
systematically. For the weakly exclusive interpretation Ramsey set down the following
two semantic rules:
Twodifferent constantsmust not have the samemeaning.Anapparent
variable cannot [have] the value of any letter occurring in its scope,
unless the letter is a variable apparent in that scope. (Ramsey, 1991,
p. 159)
The term “letter” here covers both constants (names) and variables. A variable
“apparent in the scope” of a quantifier is a variable bound by some quantifier in that
scope. So, in effect, the convention tells us that two different names cannot have the
same referent and that the range of a bound variable excludes the values (or referents)
of any free variable or name occurring in the scope of the binding quantifier. If we take
the exclusive formula ∃x∃yFxy from remark 5.532 as an example, the variables x and
y cannot take the same value because in the subformula ∃yFxy, the variable x occurs
freely within the scope of the quantifier binding the variable y. If names are present,
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Table 1. Comparison of Wittgenstein’s and Wehmeier’s translations
Russellian Wittgenstein Wehmeier
#1 Fab∧a = b Faa (or Fbb) Fab∧ (Rab∧¬Rab)
#2 Fab∧¬a = b Fab Fab∧¬(Rab∧¬Rab)
#3 ∃x∃y(Fxy ∧x = y) ∃xFxx ∃x(∃y(Fxy ∧ (Rxy ∧¬Rxy))∨
(Fxx∧ (Px∨¬Px)))
#4 ∃x∃y(Fxy ∧¬x = y) ∃x∃yFxy ∃x(∃y(Fxy ∧¬(Rxy ∧¬Rxy))∨
(Fxx∧¬(Px∨¬Px)))
#5 ∃x∃yFxy ∃x∃yFxy ∨∃xFxx ∃x(∃yFxy ∨Fxx)
their values are also excluded from the range of any bound variable in the scope of
whose quantifier they occur.6
Wehmeier’s procedure for translating classical inclusive formulas into the exclusive
notation7 has remained almost invariant throughout his papers and is given here in its
latest version.Atomic formulas can be left unchanged. The translation of a conjunction
is the conjunction of the translations of the conjuncts. The translation of a negated
formula is the negation of the translation of the formula and so on for all other
sentence connectives. So the issue boils down to (1) quantifier rules and (2) rules for
identity. Statements of the form ∀xφ are translated by ∀xø ∧ø(y1/x)∧ø(y2/x) ···
where y1,y2, ... are the free variables (or names) in φ other than x,ø is the translation
of φ into exclusive notation and ø(y1/x) is the translation of φ into exclusive notation
after replacing all free occurrences of x in φ by y1. Analogously, ∃xφx is translated
by ∃xø ∨ø(y1/x)∨ø(y2/x)∨ ··· . Identity statements of form x = y are translated
by any contradiction in x and y (for example, Rxy ∧¬Rxy) while identities of form
x = x are translated by any tautology in x (for example,Px∨¬Px). For the purpose of
translation, names can be treated as free variables, so x = y and x = x here cover both
variables and names. Translating back fromWittgenstein’s system to classical logic can
be achieved by similar rules.
Prima facie, it would seem to be a minimal requirement for any attempted
reconstruction ofWittgenstein’s account to handle the cases that are explicitly provided
in the Tractatus. So it may come as a surprise that Wehmeier’s translation procedure
fails this test. Table 1 contains the Russellian formulas of remarks 5.531 and 5.532
along with their translations according to Wittgenstein and Wehmeier.8 We are not
going to discuss the quantified cases in detail here. Concerning the quantifier-free
cases, something is clearly wrong with case #1. Wittgenstein’s translation of the non-
contradictory Russellian formula Fab∧a = b is the equally noncontradictoy formula
Faa while Wehmeier’s translation Fab∧ (Rab∧¬Rab) is contradictory, given one-to-
one correlations between names and objects (cf. Rogers & Wehmeier, 2012, p. 12). In
the next section we examine this and related cases involving individual constants more
closely.
6 A precise semantic definition will be given in §4.7.
7 We henceforth drop the qualifier “weakly.”
8 To make the comparison more transparent, we have slightly simplified the raw output of
Wehmeier’s algorithm.
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WITTGENSTEIN’S ELIMINATION OF IDENTITY 5
§4. The problem of individual constants.
4.1. Wehmeier’s treatment of individual constants. The failure in case Fab ∧a = b
is explicitly acknowledged in Rogers & Wehmeier (2012, pp. 11–12). Rogers and
Wehmeier argue that no adequate translation is possible because exclusive logic
cannot express what is classically expressed by a = b.9 On their view, Wittgenstein’s
own translation Faa (or Fbb) is inadequate, because it fails to have the same truth
conditions as the original inclusive formula.However, bothFaa andFbb are implied by
Fab∧a = b, and so Rogers and Wehmeier speculate that Wittgenstein, faced with the
impossibility of adequately translating the case, may have substituted an implication
of the original formula for translation. On our view, this dismissal of Wittgenstein’s
translation of case #1 reveals a crucial misunderstanding of Wittgenstein’s view of
identity statements. Our intention in this paper is to develop an alternative account
preserving Wittgenstein’s translation.
As a consequence of excluding case #1, Rogers and Wehmeier have restricted their
translatability results in certainways and argued for the exegetic or systematic adequacy
of these restrictions. One remedy considered by them is to impose the so-called
“satisfaction principle” on classical logic, i.e., to demand that there be a one-to-one
correlation between names and objects. This move would certainly give Rogers’ and
Wehmeier’s own translation Fab∧ (Rab∧¬Rab) the right truth conditions. But while
it is clear that Wittgenstein intends the satisfaction principle to obtain for Tractarian
logic, he nowhere suggests that it should be imposed as a prerequisite on classical
logic. In fact, it would hardly make sense for him to offer Faa or Fbb as translations
of Fab ∧a = b if a and b couldn’t co-refer in the classical statement. Therefore, it is
misleading to suggest that in imposing the satisfaction principle on classical logic we
would be “[following] Wittgenstein”(Rogers & Wehmeier, 2012, p. 11).
Wehmeier states that, with respect to languages without any individual constants,
“W-logic and FOL= are fully equivalent” (Wehmeier, 2008, p. 10). Consequently,
another argument given byRogers andWehmeier for the adequacy of their presentation
of “W-logic” is that, according to Wittgenstein, “names are not essential for a
description of the world” (Rogers & Wehmeier, 2012, p. 10). Indeed, the following
remark of the Tractatus can be quoted in support of this argument:
5.526 We can describe the world completely by means of fully
generalized propositions, i.e., without first correlating any name with
a particular object.
In a footnote, Rogers andWehmeier equate this idea with the eliminability of names
from first-order logic and point to a technical proof of this in Boolos, Burgess, &
Jeffrey (2007, pp. 255–257). So, in effect, the problem of accounting for Wittgenstein’s
translation of case #1 is simply rejected as irrelevant because names can be eliminated
from first-order logic without loss of expressive power. One thing to note concerning
this argument is that Wittgenstein is very explicit in his examples that individual
constants are part of the language of Tractarian logic. So it seems strange to base
an argument for the acceptability of a translation procedure on the eliminability of
9 See Wehmeier (2008, pp. 11–12) for a proof to this effect. This proof will be examined in
§4.3.
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these names. Furthermore, the proof in Boolos merely shows that for each formula
φ containing names there is a formula ø without names which is satisfiable iff φ is
satisfiable. In our context, this standard of equisatisfiability seems too low to guarantee
the expressive adequacy of exclusive translations.
Finally, Wehmeier suggests that the problem could be solved by adding a “co-
denotation predicate” to the language of Tractarian logic (Wehmeier, 2008, pp. 12–14),
which expresses not identity of object but identity of meaning as a relation between
signs. This approach is based on remark 4.241ff (see above, §2). The fact that this is
possible and renders Tractarian logic equivalent to classical logic is a significant result.
Still, the question remains how this proposal relates to Wittgenstein’s main idea of
eliminating the identity sign. Clearly, this idea is not restricted to a sign for “objectual
identity”; his claim is straight and simple: there is no need for any kind of identity
sign in logic. This point is made clearly in 5.533 and also, for example in Waismann’s
“Thesen”(cf. Waismann, 1984, pp. 242–243). Another reason why this isn’t convincing
is that it makes little sense as an account of the translations in 5.531. According to
metalinguistic identity, the translation of Fab∧a = b would not be Faa (or Fbb) but
Fab∧a ≡ b with the triple bar representing metalinguistic identity.
So it seems that after considering Wehmeier’s arguments, the fact remains that his
translation procedure cannot account for case #1. The arguments for why this isn’t
a serious problem are unconvincing and so in the absence of further arguments we
have to conclude that either Wittgenstein’s proposal is a failure unless first-order logic
is restricted in artificial ways or there must be some other way of accounting for
Wittgenstein’s case #1.
4.2. The missing case. Before we go on to discuss case #1 and its possible
accommodation in a systematic account of Tractarian logic, we should point out
a peculiar gap in Wittgenstein’s presentation of cases. The basic cases concerning
names and quantifiers are presented in 5.531 and 5.532. Comparing these two remarks
and the five cases presented there, reveals a certain symmetry which is broken at
one point. In 5.532, Wittgenstein first presents the cases ∃x∃y(Fxy ∧ x = y) and
∃x∃y(Fxy ∧¬x = y), which translate to ∃xFxx and ∃x∃yFxy, respectively. In these
two cases, the statement in exclusive notation (which is usually more cumbersome) is
actually shorter than the inclusive statement, so let us call these two cases “contracting
cases.” These two are followed by a parenthetical remark giving a case which we will
(in analogy) call the “expanding case”: ∃x∃yFxy, translated as ∃x∃yFxy∨∃xFxx. In
5.531,we see thatWittgenstein also first presents the two contracting cases:Fab∧a = b,
translated either as Faa or Fbb, and Fab∧¬a = b, translated as Fab. What is missing
in 5.531, however, is the parenthetical statement of the expanding case. This omission
seems all the more striking because it is obvious that the inclusive statement using
names, which would correspond to the inclusive ∃x∃yFxy, is readily available: it is
simply the statementFab. The symmetry between 5.531 and 5.532 is clearly intentional,
so it couldn’t be lost onWittgenstein that there was a missing case in 5.532. Why didn’t
Wittgenstein provide a translation for this case?
The answer seems to be that the translation of the inclusive Fab is even more
problematic than the translationofFab∧a = bwhichhas hauntedWehmeier’s account.
What seems clear is that the translation of Fab has to contain a disjunction of cases,
Fab being equivalent to Fab ∧a = b ∨Fab ∧¬a = b. This would also be in line with
the translation of the expanding case ∃x∃yFxy. Going on Wehmeier’s sensible rule
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of translating a disjunction by the disjunction of the translations of the disjuncts, this
would seem to yield a disjunction with either Faa or Fbb as first disjunct and Fab
(exclusive) as second disjunct. Putting these together would yield either Faa ∨Fab
or Fbb ∨Fab (exclusive) as translations of Fab (inclusive). But this is intolerable,
because Faa ∨Fab and Fbb ∨Fab are clearly not equivalent. This peculiarity reflects
back onWittgenstein’s translation of case #1 because it makes us wonder what exactly
Wittgenstein meant by translating Fab ∧a = b as “Faa or Fbb.” It seems clear that
this “or” cannot be a disjunction in the object language, but taking it as the license to
translate either way (which seems the most natural reading) is also problematic once
we go beyond the simplest case. Certainly, the exclusive translations Faa and Fbb are,
in a sense, equivalent. This is not logical equivalence in the ordinary sense, but given
the co-reference expressed by the identity statement a = b, there should be nothing
to distinguish between Faa and Fbb because the names a and b are intersubstitutable
throughout the formula. How to incorporate this view into a coherent translation of
the “missing case,” however, will be one of the main challenges in this paper.
4.3. Criteria of success. Aspointed out in 4.1,Wehmeier (2008, pp. 11–12) contains
a proof thatWittgensteinian logic cannot express what is expressed by a = b in classical
first-order logic. What this proof boils down to is that there are certain first-order
structures which can be distinguished by the formula a = b but cannot be distinguished
by any formula of Wittgensteinian logic. Given two structures U1 and U2 in which (1)
all predicates apply universally and (2) the only difference between the structures is
that in U1 the constants a and b have the same interpretation, whereas in U2 the
interpretation ℑ(a) differs from ℑ(b), the classical formula a = b will be true in U1
and false in U2. But there is no formula of exclusive logic for which this holds; all
exclusive formulas will be either true in both structures or false in both structures.
From the point of present-day model theory, the proof is impeccable. But one could
argue that from Wittgenstein’s perspective the concept of “truth condition” used to
state the result of the proof begs the question againstWittgenstein.Wittgenstein’s point
may be that in the crucial case at the center of the proof there is nothing to distinguish.
Adapting some of Wittgenstein’s terminology, the difference between these structures
is a mere pseudo-difference.
Still, what the proof shows is that if one is serious about accommodating all of
Wittgenstein’s cases, there is no way around facing the possibility that classical and
Tractarian logic are not equivalent in the sense that certain things expressible in classical
logic may be inexpressible in exclusive notation. Rogers and Wehmeier note that case
#1 reveals an “incommensurability” of the two logics under investigation, but lay the
blame on Wittgenstein for failing to provide an “adequate translation” (Rogers &
Wehmeier, 2012, p. 12). It is clear that there is a strong desire on Wehmeier’s part to
show the equivalence between classical and Tractarian logic. Motivating this desire is
the idea that only by showing the equivalence between classical and Tractarian logic
can we counter indispensability arguments for the identity relation (Wehmeier, 2012,
cf.). On our view, we shouldn’t presuppose that strict equivalence to classical logic
is necessary to prove the adequacy of the exclusive notation. It may well be that,
according to Wittgenstein, certain things expressible only by means of identity are
better left unexpressed.
This complicates the search for criteria for assessing the success of any solution.
Obviously, the aim would still be to achieve some kind of equivalence between inclusive
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8 TIMM LAMPERT AND MARKUS SÄBEL
and exclusive notation, even though the scope of this equivalence will be limited by
Wittgenstein’s philosophical arguments concerning identity. In contemporary logic,
logical equivalence is usually spelled out by reference to a semantics of the language.
Even apart from specific worries about identity, this is somewhat problematic in the
context of Tractarian logic, because Wittgenstein was strongly critical of set theory as
a tool in the foundations of mathematics and favored a purely syntactical approach to
logic.10 But we don’t want to restrict ourselves prematurely to this kind of approach.
If there is anything wrong in using model theory in our context, this should emerge
from our investigations and not be presupposed by fiat.
Because a semantics for the exclusive notation needs to be sensitive to our account
of the identity sign, we won’t start until §4.7 to define a suitable concept of logical
equivalence. In the meantime we will sometimes use simple classical models to point
out certain problems. We might thus illustrate the problem of translating the “missing
case” in the followingway: If we assign different objects o1 and o2 to a and b respectively
and the set containing only the pair (o1,o1) to the predicate F, the missing case Fab
(inclusive) will turn out false but the hypothetical exclusive translation Faa∨Fab will
turn out true. On the other hand, Fbb ∨Fab (exclusive), which is supposed to be an
alternative (and therefore equivalent) translation of Fab (inclusive) turns out false.
4.4. The scope of names. Concerning the failure of equivalence between Fab
(inclusive) and Faa∨Fab (or Fbb∨Fab) (exclusive), it is not too difficult to see what’s
going wrong. As an intermediate step we have proposed to treat Fab as equivalent to
Fab∧a = b∨Fab∧¬a = b. In translating the subformula Fab∧a = b (inclusive) into
Faa (or Fbb) (exclusive) we have in effect assumed a and b to refer to the same object.
In translating the subformula Fab∧¬a = b (inclusive) into Fab (exclusive) we have in
effect assumed a and b to refer to different objects. Therefore it may seem illegitimate
to apply the model ℑ(a) = o1, ℑ(b) = o2, ℑ(F ) = {(o1,o1)} to the whole formula
Faa ∨Fab (exclusive) because the model violates the assumption used for generating
the exclusive subformula Faa (or Fbb). Similarly, any model with ℑ(a) = ℑ(b) would
seem inapplicable to the exclusive subformula Fab.
These observations reveal a certain predicament which may have lead Wehmeier
to his treatment of names. If we really want to represent the content of the inclusive
formula Fab in one single formula of exclusive notation, we have to ensure that the
models we use to evaluate our translations are in line with the identity statements that
we used to manufacture the exclusive statements. This would require only models with
ℑ(a) = ℑ(b) to be applied to the first disjunct of Faa ∨Fab and only models with
ℑ(a) 6= ℑ(b) to be applied to the second disjunct. Under such a modified semantics,
we get exactly the right truth conditions for our exclusive test statements.
Approaching this as a technical problem, the main challenge then would be how
to “remember” which identity statements were used to generate which part of the
exclusive formula without making the account circular. As an example of an obviously
circular “solution,” we could simply index every subformula in the exclusive statement
with the identity statements that went into the translation. Such an account, however,
would hardly prove identity to be an expendable part of logical notation. On the other
10 Compare, for example, remark 6.031 about the “superfluity” of set theory in mathematics
and the irrelevance of “accidental generality” for mathematics.
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hand, it seems clear that some kind of extra notation is needed to fix the class of
applicable models for each subformula. It is not enough, for example, as a general rule,
to restrict interpretation to single disjuncts. Just by looking at the exclusive formula,
we cannot tell which models we should use to interpret the disjunct Faa in Faa ∨Fab
(exclusive). Faa ∨Fab could be the result of translating Fab, but it could also be the
result of translating (Faa∨Fab)∧¬a = b. Only in the first, but not in the second case,
would it be appropriate to use models with ℑ(a) = ℑ(b) for interpreting the disjunct
Faa.
Interestingly enough, Wittgenstein himself seems to provide a blueprint for an
appropriate notational device in the Notebooks. In the entry for December 2, 1916
he writes:
The similarity of the generality notation and the argument appears if
we write (ax)φx instead of φa. (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 90)
What Wittgenstein seems to mean is: Instead of using a name to fill the argument
position of a predicate, we could leave the open sentence φx and use (ax) to indicate
that the variable position x is “bound” by the name a. Let us term this device the
“denotifier.”There is no indication thatWittgenstein intended to use it for any technical
purpose. Nevertheless, we could recruit it for our purposes because the similarity
to quantifiers makes it possible to draw a crucial distinction. For the translation of
the “missing case,” we could now—quite similar to Wittgenstein’s translation of the
expanding case ∃x∃yFxy—write (ax)(by)Fxy ∨ (ax)Fxx while the translation of
(Fab ∨Faa)∧¬a = b would become (ax)(by)(Fxy ∨Fxx). Similar to quantifiers,
each name is thereby assigned a certain scope.
There would still remain the problem of how exactly to fix the class of applicable
models. But even assuming any device such as the denotifier could be made to work,
we think that there is an overwhelming reason not to pursue this approach, quite apart
from the obvious fact that there is no indication whatsoever that Wittgenstein ever
intended to introduce this kind of apparatus in order to deal with names in exclusive
notation. The main problem is that Wittgenstein’s injunction to “express identity of
object by identity of sign” is clearly violated if we use models assigning different
referents to a certain name in different parts of the formula. According toWittgenstein,
one name should have the same meaning throughout a formula and different names
should have different meanings throughout the formula. There is simply no way to do
justice to this requirement while segmenting a formula into different scopes in which
the same name may have different meanings or different names may have the same
meaning. The “missing case” therefore faces us with a stark choice: Either we must
give up Wittgenstein’s main principle concerning identity and invent a device such as
the denotifier or we must give up the representability of the missing case (and similar
cases) in a single exclusive formula. In the next section, we want to explore this second
option.
4.5. Translation as disambiguation. So far, we have concluded that the inclusive
formula Fab seems to contain two possibilities of translation into exclusive notation:
Faa (or, equivalently, Fbb) and Fab. The inclusive notation leaves these two
possibilities open and it is this feature that cannot be represented in a single formula
in the exclusive notation. The question may then be: Should it be possible to represent
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10 TIMM LAMPERT AND MARKUS SÄBEL
these possibilities or is there some way to show that, from Wittgenstein’s standpoint,
all is well if we reject the representability of this feature in a single formula?
As an alternative approach, we could argue that the inclusive statement Fab is
ambiguous between the case a = b, which can be expressed as Faa or Fbb and the
case ¬a = b, which can be expressed as Fab. Because in the exclusive notation, the
correlation between names and objects has to be one-to-one, the only way to represent
this ambiguity is to say that Fab (inclusive) becomes either Faa/Fbb (exclusive) or
Fab (exclusive). A similar use of “metalinguistic disjunction” can be found explicitly
in remark 5.531. The inclusive Fab∧a = b, Wittgenstein proposes to translate by Faa
“or” Fbb. It’s obvious that this is not a disjunction in the object language. It is a license
to write either Faa or Fbb, not a license to write Faa ∨Fbb.
We propose that a similar reading could be applied to the translation of the “missing
case.” The analogy is this: In both cases there is a multiplicity of possible translations
which cannot be expressed by a disjunction of cases in the object language. In
translating Fab (inclusive), we have tomake up ourminds whether to write Faa or Fab
(both exclusive). From this viewpoint, translation becomes a form of disambiguation.
Of course, there is also a disanalogy between the two cases. In the case of translating
Fab ∧ a = b (inclusive), the exclusive translations Faa and Fbb are, in a sense,
equivalent. By this, we don’t mean that they are logically equivalent in the ordinary
sense (they aren’t). But given the co-reference expressed by the identity statement a = b,
there is nothing to distinguish between Faa and Fbb because the names a and b are
intersubstitutable throughout the formula. In the case of translating the missing case
Fab, the two possible translations are nonequivalent in that sense; they are different
possibilities of disambiguation. So there are two distinctmetalinguistic uses of “or” that
cannot be translated by a disjunction in the object language. Fab ∧a = b (inclusive)
can equivalently be translated as Faa “or” Fbb (both exclusive). Fab (inclusive) can
nonequivalently be disambiguated as Faa “or” Fab (both exclusive).11
There is some evidence in the text of the Tractatus that Wittgenstein may have
thought that anyone who understands a certain sentence must already know whether
the names occurring in that sentence have the same meaning or different meanings
(see, for example, remarks 4.243 and 6.2322), so that all we have to do for translating
a sentence like Fab (inclusive) is to decide whether what we mean is Faa (exclusive) or
Fab (exclusive). A good way to motivate this approach independently of a Tractarian
perspective is by appeal to Etchemendy’s distinction between interpretational and
representational semantics (cf. Etchemendy, 1999). According to Etchemendy, there
are two ways to understand the models of a formal language. On the representational
view, different models represent different possible configurations of the world. For
example, a truth table may tell us, that the sentence “Snow is white and roses are red”
would be false if snowwas not white. On the interpretational view, the truth table would
support a much different counterfactual, not about the world, but about language. For
example, the sentence “Snow is white and roses are red” would have been false had
“Snow is white” meant what “George Washington had a beard” means now.
11 Henceforth, we will omitWittgenstein’s parenthetical translation Fbb of Fab∧a = b because
it is just another way of writing Faa. Instead of giving all possible ways a formula could be
written exclusively, we therefore propose to only give all possible translations that are distinct
in meaning.
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WITTGENSTEIN’S ELIMINATION OF IDENTITY 11
When we look at the models of first-order logic through this lens, it seems obvious
that the interpretation of names belongs to the interpretational paradigm, while the
interpretation of predicates is much more naturally understood as representational.
According to Etchemendy, a standard representational semantics for a language
needs two things: “First we define a class of models that will represent all possible
configurations of the world relevant to the truth values of our sentences”(Etchemendy,
1999, p. 21). The second is a recursive definition of truth, but let’s focus on the first
step. What aspects of classical models can reasonably be understood as “representing
possible configurations of the world”?
It seems clear that the representational reading is much more natural for the
interpretation of predicates than for the interpretation of names. What really changes
between ℑ(a) = ℑ(b) and ℑ(a) 6= ℑ(b)? Only what the names a and b mean in the
model. The change affects only the “Bezeichnungsweise” (“mode of signifying,” cf.
3.3421). On the other hand, the change from ℑ(F ) = {} to ℑ(F ) = {(o1,o1)} can
readily be understood as the change from a world in which no objects stand in the
relation F vs. a world in which at least one object o1 has F to itself.
From Wittgenstein’s standpoint, logic should only represent facts, which are “the
existence of states of affairs” (2), which are formed by “configurations of objects”
(2.0272). Anything belonging only to the mode of signifying may be shown, but cannot
be said. From this standpoint, it seems natural to insist that the interpretation of
names in classical model theory doesn’t really belong there. Interpreting a name is just
a way of fixing its meaning and finding out what a sentence means is a prerequisite
for translating it. So as long as we don’t even know whether a and b refer to the
same object or to different objects, there is no way to unambiguously represent Fab
(inclusive) as a single formula in the exclusive notation. If we insist on formulating an
algorithm for providing exclusive translations of inclusive formulas including names,
all we can do is offer possible translations. To repeat: Fab (inclusive) considered by
itself is ambiguous because it is unclear whether a and b refer to the same or to different
objects. In exclusive notation, we can express this ambiguity by offering the set of two
possible translations: {Faa,Fab}.
This account of translating from inclusive to exclusive statements puts into effect
the understanding of identity Wittgenstein expresses in remarks 4.241 and following
(cf. §2). The statement a = b is not an assertion that can be true or false, it is a rule
for the use of the signs a and b, allowing a to be substituted for b and vice versa.
Putting this understanding into effect dispels the problems concerning constants that
have plagued Wehmeier’s account and preserves Wittgenstein’s translations offered
in 5.531.
4.6. Translating prefix-matrix forms. Canwe generalize the paradigmcaseswe have
examined so far into a procedure for translating at least a fragment of quantifier-free
classical logic into the exclusive dialect? The formulas Fab ∧a = b and Fab ∧¬a = b
exemplify away of thinking about identity statements that has emerged in the context of
the “denotifier”: There is a certain analogy between identity statements and quantifiers.
Similar to the way a “prefix” of quantifiers governs the use of variables in a “matrix,”
the statements a = b and ¬a = b can be seen as rules governing the use of names in
the statement Fab. To keep the analogy tight, we will at first extend this approach to
formulas in “prefix-matrix form” (PMF), i.e., formulas consisting of an identity-free
part (the “matrix”) connected by conjunction to a conjunction of identity statements
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12 TIMM LAMPERT AND MARKUS SÄBEL
(the “prefix”). We stipulate that (1) the prefix may be empty, but not the matrix,
(2) prefixes should be consistent and nonredundant and (3) all names occurring in
the prefix must occur in the matrix.12 The reasoning behind these stipulations will
emerge more clearly in the next two sections; but for the moment we simply want to
restrict ourselves to cases in which the prefix can clearly be interpreted as a set of rules
governing the use of names occurring in the matrix.
The first challenge will be to define the notion of an unambiguous formula in prefix-
matrix form. The number of possible interpretations of an ambiguous formula in
PMF will depend on two factors: (1) the number of names used in the matrix and
(2) the prefix. Mathematically, the most succinct way of expressing possibilities of
disambiguation based on a set of names is by co-reference sets, which are partitions
of the set of names into sets of co-referring names. For two names a and b there are
only two possible partitions: {{a,b}}, in which a and b co-refer and {{a},{b}}, in
which a and b have distinct reference. For three names there are five, for four names
fifteen. In general, the number of possible disambiguations of a formula with n names
will be equal to the nth Bell number. Let us call a conjunction of identity statements
inducing a partition on a set of names a “canonical conjunction of identity statements”
or “canonical conjunction” (CC) for short. A canonical conjunction expressing the co-
reference set {{a,b},{c,d}}, for example, will be a = b∧ c = d ∧¬a = c.13 A formula
in prefix-matrix form will then be considered unambiguous if the prefix is “canonical”
relative to the matrix.
If a given prefix-matrix form is ambiguous, it has to be expanded into a disjunction
of unambiguous PMF. This can be achieved by considering the set of all co-reference
sets consistent with the given prefix. The original formula will be equivalent to the
disjunction of the conjunctions of the matrix with CCs expressing the elements of this
set. Let us call this disjunction of unambiguous PMF,which is equivalent to the original
PMF, the “disambiguating disjunction” (DD) for that PMF. Based on the DD of the
formula, the set of possible translations into exclusive notation can then be generated
by substituting in accordance with the prefixes of the individual disjuncts of the DD,
each disjunct generating one possible translation.14 For illustration, here are the steps
for the missing case Fab: Based on the set {a,b} of names occurring in the matrix
Fab, there are two CC: a = b and ¬a = b, expressing the co-reference sets {{a,b}} and
{{a},{b}}, respectively. Since both CC are consistent with the (empty) prefix of Fab,
the disambiguating disjunction of unambiguous PMF is Fab∧a = b∨Fab∧¬a = b.15
12 That is we exclude cases like a = b where the prefix governs nomatrix, cases likeFab∧a = b∧
¬a = b, Fab∧¬a = a or Fab∧a = a, in which the prefix is either inconsistent or contains
identities classically considered to be logical truths or falsehoods, and cases like Fab∧c = d
where prefix and matrix bypass each other.
13 For most co-reference sets there will be more than one equivalent canonical conjunction. In
the example, we could also use a = b∧ c = d ∧¬b = d to express the same co-reference set.
14 If the prefix contains positive identities, there will be more than one possible substitution
with the same meaning. For the sake of economy, we arbitrarily choose the substitution that
comes first in lexical order. See footnote 11.
15 Since we have coined the term “prefix” for the identities a = b and ¬a = b in this formula,
it might be more perspicuous to use a notation reflecting the analogy to quantifiers by for
example writing (a = b)Fab ∨ (¬a = b)Fab, but since this makes no logical difference we
stick with Wittgenstein’s “postfix” notation of remark 5.531.
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Each disjunct of the DD yields a possible translation by substituting in accordance
with the respective CC, yielding the set {Faa,Fab} of possible translations.
4.7. Logical equivalence for prefix-matrix forms. At this point we return to the
question posed in §4.2: Is there a sense in which a set of possible exclusive translations
can be considered logically equivalent to an inclusive formula? There are two main
difficulties for defining a suitable concept. First, we have to explain what it means for a
single formula to be logically equivalent to a set of formulas. Second, there is the fact
that, while classically understood, identity statements contribute to the truth conditions
of a formula, exclusively understood they instead fix the meaning of the identity-free
part of the formula. In order to do justice to the exclusive viewpoint, the definition of
logical equivalence has to reflect this difference.
In the last section, we already defined the concept of a “disambiguating disjunction,”
which is the disjunction of unambiguous PMF equivalent to some ambiguous PMF
of inclusive logic. Since each disjunct of the DD generates one possible exclusive
translation, we solve the first difficulty by defining an inclusive PMF φ to be logically
equivalent to a set of possible exclusive translations iff for every disjunct of the
disambiguating disjunction of φ there is a logically equivalent exclusive translation in
the set of possible translations and vice versa. Logical equivalence between individual
unambiguous inclusive formula (the “DD”) and individual exclusive translation can
be defined by restricting the available models to those we may term “appropriate” to
the prefix that goes into the translation. In the example of the missing case, we will thus
only use models with ℑ(a) = ℑ(b) for assessing the equivalence between Fab∧a = b
and Faa and only models with ℑ(a) 6= ℑ(b) for assessing the equivalence between
Fab∧¬a = b and Fab.
In general, an unambiguous inclusive formula in PMF φ is logically equivalent to
an exclusive formula ø iff for all models M that are appropriate for φ, M satisfies φ
iff it satisfies ø. A model M is considered appropriate for φ iff its interpretation of
names is consistent with the prefix of φ.16 An interpretation of names is consistent
with a prefix iff it would classically be considered to make the prefix true. On this
conception, {Faa,Fab} indeed proves to be a logically equivalent exclusive translation
of Fab (inclusive).
§5. The problem of pseudo-propositions.
5.1. Wehmeier’s approach to pseudo-propositions. Next to the problem concerning
names there is a second problemwithWehmeier’s account ofWittgenstein’s elimination
of identity having to do with so-called “pseudo-propositions” (Scheinsätze) of classical
logic. Following the outline of his proposal in remarks 5.53 to 5.533, Wittgensteins
claims:
5.534 And now we see that in a correct conceptual notation
pseudo-propositions like ‘a = a’, ‘a = b.b = c.⊃ .a = c’, ‘(x).x = x’,
‘(∃x).x = a’, etc. cannot even be written down.
16 This notion of an “appropriate” model marks the main difference to Wehmeier’s approach.
Wehmeier defines logical equivalence based only on structures and assignments that are
1-1 on names and free variables. This imposition of an exclusive semantics on the inclusive
notation has masked the problematic nature of case #1 for Wehmeier.
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From the standpoint of classical logic, all these formulas would be considered logical
truths. Since we are dealing only with quantifier-free logic at the moment, we may
restrict our attention to a = a and a = b∧b = c→ a = c (a.k.a. the law of transitivity).
Based on our interpretation of Wittgenstein’s understanding of the identity sign so far,
why would he consider these formulas to be “pseudo-propositions”? For one, it seems
clear that neither of the two is interpretable as a substitution license or prohibition
fixing the use of names in any way. Second, these formulas lack matrices, consisting
purely of identity statements. Most interpreters have taken 5.534 to exclude formulas
like a = a from the “correct conceptual notation.”17Wehmeier, as we have seen, takes
a different approach. He takes statements of the form x = x to be translatable into
a tautology involving x, and statements of the form x = y to be translatable into a
contradiction involving x and y.
The essential virtue of this approach, which was probably decisive for Wehmeier’s
endorsement of it, is the fact that only by translating a = a as a tautology is there any
hope of getting equivalent exclusive translations for equivalent inclusive statements. In
classical logic, a = a is equivalent toFa∨¬Fa. So any translation procedure that would
translate a truth-functional tautology into a truth-functional tautology, butwould deny
a = a representation in the exclusive notation, would violate what we could call the
“equivalence principle,” namely, that formulas which are classically equivalent should
also have equivalent exclusive translations. In order to make this principle precise, let
us call two exclusive formulas φ and ø logically equivalent iff for all models M that
are 1-1 on the set of names M satisfies φ iff M satisfies ø.18 We can then define two
classical formulas φ and ø to have equivalent exclusive translations iff either (1) both
are classified as pseudo-propositions from the exclusive standpoint, or (2) neither φ
nor ø are classified as pseudo-propositions and their translations are equivalent.
The evidence that Wittgenstein didn’t intend the pseudo-propositions of 5.534 to
be represented by tautologies or contradictions is very strong, however. In 5.531,
the phrase Wittgenstein uses to give his translations is “Ich schreibe also nicht [ ...],
sondern [ ...].”19 So it seems obvious that there is an intended contrast, when in
5.534 he says, “dass Scheinsätze wie [ ...] sich in einer richtigen Begriffsschrift gar
nicht hinschreiben lassen” (our emphasis).20 Wehmeier thinks we should interpret this
phrase literally: Since the new notation doesn’t contain the identity sign, a = a literally
cannot be written down (Rogers & Wehmeier, 2012, p. 13). But given the context
of the remark this seems artificial. If Wittgenstein had wanted to use a tautology as
17 See for example Fogelin (1987, p. 74), McGray (2006, p. 159) and Kremer (2007, p. 155).
18 Atfirst, this definitionmay seemat oddswith our earlier contention that in a certain senseFaa
and Fbb are equivalent translations of the inclusive formula Fab ∧ a = b because it makes
Faa and Fbb nonequivalent. But what we meant is that it doesn’t matter which way we
substitute as long as the substitution is carried out uniformly. In the case of a single formula
this means uniformly throughout the whole formula, but in the case of multiple formulas
to be translated into exclusive notation, the substitution has to be carried out uniformly
throughout the whole set of formulas. So the criterion of logical equivalence should only
be applied to formulas translated according to the same substitution. Relative to a fixed
substitution, Faa and Fbb should indeed count as non-equivalent.
19 “Thus I do not write [ ...] but [ ...].”
20 “That in a correct conceptual notation pseudo-propositions like [ ...] cannot even be written
down.”
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the exclusive transcription of a = a, it would have been natural for him to write “Ich
schreibe also nicht a = a, sondernFa∨¬Fa” (or any other tautologous formula). Also
the expression “gar nicht” (“not at all”) seems to indicate that there is nothing to be
written down. Finally, ifWittgenstein onlymeant to say that these pseudo-propositions
cannot literally be written down, this would also exclude the sentences in 5.531 to
5.5321 from being written down since they also include the identity sign. But for these
sentences Wittgenstein explicitly offers instructions on how to write them down. We
also take issue with Wehmeier’s suggestion that pseudo-propositions like a = a are
conceptually in the same category as truth-functional tautologies.21 It is widely agreed
that there is a distinction to be made between non-sensical pseudo-propositions and
merely senseless tautologies.22 Tautologies are never marked as “Scheinsätze” in the
Tractatus.23
An even stronger piece of evidence comes from an interesting letter by Wittgenstein
addressed to Ramsey in 1927. In his “Foundations of Mathematics” Ramsey had
acknowledged Wittgenstein’s criticism of identity, but instead of abandoning it, he
defined a substitute for the identity relation.According to this definition, any formula of
the form x = y will be either tautologous or contradictory. Now, in the letter criticizing
Ramsey’s definition, Wittgenstein writes, after summarizing Ramsey’s account:
I will try to show that this definition won’t do nor any other that tries
to make x = y a tautology or a contradiction. (Ramsey, 1991, p. 339,
our emphasis)
From an exegetical point of view this seems to settle the issue. We may still reflect
about whyWittgenstein didn’t want to “make x = y a tautology or a contradiction”.
One systematic reason seems to be Wittgenstein’s analysis of logical truth as truth-
functional tautology. Logical truth is not a matter of the content of any statement
but only of the form of truth-functional combination of atomic propositions. But this
wouldn’t be true of identity statements because statements like a = a or ∀xx = x
would emerge as logical truths which are not truth-functional tautologies. Also, since
a = a seems to be an atomic proposition and yet a logical truth, it would no longer be
possible to thinkof theworld as an assignment of truth-values to atomic propositions.24
According toWittgenstein, all atomic propositions represented in the formalism should
be bipolar, i.e., capable of being true or false, which certainly isn’t the case for a = a.
5.2. Excluding pseudo-propositions. As a next step, we should wonder how
comprehensive is this class of nonsensical pseudo-propositions? Concerning instances
of the “law of identity,” i.e., formulas like a = a or b = b, the reasoning seems clear.
Applying the understanding of identity statements we ascribe to Wittgenstein, we
argue that, since any name is always substitutable for itself, a = a represents an empty
substitution rule. Analogously, we argue that ¬a = a, which is not explicitly treated in
21 Cf. Rogers & Wehmeier (2012, p. 12).
22 See Glock (1996, p. 232), for example. In the typescript TS 202, fol.64v, there is the following
note in Russell’s hand: “6.2 Scheinsätze = pseudo-props [as opposed to tautologies & to
significant props]”(Graßhoff & Lampert, 2004, p. 245).
23 The term “Scheinsatz” appears three times in the Tractatus: in remarks 4.1272, 5.534 and
6.2.
24 See, for example, White (1979), Landini (2007, p. 253) and Wehmeier (2008).
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5.534 (or anywhere else in theTractatus), must be considered a nonsensical substitution
rule prohibiting the substitution of a name for itself. This difference between empty
and nonsensical rules becomes important when we consider a = a and ¬a = a as
possible prefixes. In Fab∧a = a the prefix is redundant; since nothing is prescribed it
can be eliminated without loss. So in our view Fab ∧a = a is equivalent to Fab and
can be disambiguated as Faa or Fab (exclusive). In Fab∧¬a = a, however, the prefix
is nonsensical, prescribing something impossible. On our interpretation, this vitiates
any translation into exclusive notation. What about a = b? This is neither a redundant
nor a nonsensical substitution rule, but occurring in isolation, it is unclear what the
rule is supposed to be applied to. Exploiting the prefix-matrix analogy, a = b by itself
may be considered similar to a quantifier occurring by itself. But ∀x or ∃x by itself
would usually not be considered a well-formed formula. Our conclusion is that a = b
by itself should similarly be considered ill-formed and therefore denied translation.25
In summary:
• Any prefix not governing any matrix must be considered nonsensical because
there is no proposition the substitution rules are applied to.
• Identity-logical “truths” such as a = a or the law of transitivity occurring in a
prefix governing a matrix must be considered redundant because they don’t fix
the use of names in any way.
• Identity-logical “falsehoods” such as ¬a = a occurring in a prefix governing
a matrix must be considered nonsensical because there is no coherent way to
prescribe different meanings for one and the same name.
In §5.1 we introduced the “equivalence principle” stating that formulas which are
classically equivalent should also have equivalent exclusive translations. It is clear that
this principle is violated if we deny formulas like a = a, a = b or ¬a = a representation
in the exclusive notation. For example, Fa ∨¬Fa is classically equivalent to a = a.
However, since the first formula is in prefix-matrix form (with an empty prefix) it
can be translated into Fa ∨¬Fa while a = a by itself has no exclusive translation.
Thus, classically equivalent formulas receive translations into exclusive notation which
are non-equivalent in the sense that one is translated as a tautology while the other
is denied representation. As we see it, this strange feature of the exclusive notation
is a consequence of Wittgenstein’s critique of the classical understanding of identity.
Conceptualizing identity as a relation between objects can be seen as the kind of
“misunderstanding of language” to be cleared up by philosophical analysis. From
Wittgenstein’s perspective, classical quantifier-free logic falls short of constituting a
proper logic. This defect shows up in the way the proper understanding of identity (as
a rule governing the use of signs) invalidates certain classical formulas and principles
of inference. However, in the cases we have dealt with so far, this violation of the
equivalence principle is merely a “local” violation in the sense that it only affects
the distinction between nonsensical pseudo-propositions on the one hand and merely
senseless tautologies and contradictions on the other hand. In other words, there
25 In the Notebooks, a = b is explicitly qualified as “Scheinsatz” (Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 19).
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aren’t any cases in which the equivalence principle is violated unless the translation of
equivalent formulas yields a tautology or contradiction in one case and is rejected as a
pseudo-proposition in the other case.
§6. Towards a generalized translation procedure.
6.1. Disjunctive prefix-matrix forms. We are now in possession of (1) a positive
criterion defining a class of formulas whose translation into exclusive notation seems
clear (“prefix-matrix form”) and (2) a negative criterion defining a class of formulas
which must be considered untranslatable (“pseudo-propositions”). In between these
classes, there is still a large gray area of formulas whose translatability is doubtful. In
this and the next section we attempt to generalize both of our criteria into an account
covering this area.
In §4.6, we only considered formulas consisting of a single matrix and a single
prefix. We now consider disjunctive prefix-matrix forms (DPMF), which we define
as disjunctions (which may be of length one) of subformulas in prefix-matrix form
as defined in §4.6. Since a DPMF will typically have multiple matrices and multiple
prefixes, we have to adjust condition (3) for prefixes (cf. §4.6): names in prefixes should
occur in somematrix of the DPMF (not necessarily the matrix governed by the prefix).
To generate the DD for a DPMF we proceed as follows:
1. Generate the set of canonical conjunctions expressing all possible partitions of
the set of names occurring in any matrix.
2. For each CC in the set that is consistent with at least one prefix in the DPMF,
we generate one disjunct of the DD by:
(a) Forming the disjunction of all matrices of the DPMF whose prefix is
consistent with the CC.
(b) Conjoining the CC as prefix to this disjunction.
Let us illustrate this procedure with an example. For the formula (Fab∨Gab)∧a =
b∨Fac∧a = b∧¬a = c, which is in disjunctive prefix-matrix form, there are two CCs
expressing different partitions of the set of names compatible with at least one of the
prefixes: {a = b∧a = c,a = b∧¬a = c}. To generate the disambiguating conjunction,
we take each CC in turn and conjoin it to the disjunction of all matrices whose
prefixes are consistent with the CC. This yields the DD (Fab∨Gab)∧a = b∧a = c ∨
(Fab ∨Gab ∨Fac)∧ a = b ∧¬a = c. Each disjunct of the DD is an unambiguous
PMF and can be used to generate one possible exclusive translation by substitution,
yielding the set of possible translations {Faa∨Gaa,Faa∨Gaa∨Fac}. Since a DPMF
generates a disambiguating disjunction just like themore restrictive PMF, the definition
of logical equivalence given in 4.7 applies equally to DPMF.
6.2. Disjunctive normal forms. Disjunctive prefix-matrix forms are still a fairly
narrow class of formulas. For further generalization we take a second look at the
stipulations for prefix-matrix form in §4.6. There we required (1) that the matrix not
be empty, (2) that the prefix be consistent and nonredundant and (3) that all names
occurring in prefixes also occur in thematrix. Stipulations (1) and (2) were partly borne
out by our analysis in Section 5.2, since identity statements occurring in isolation,
as well as inconsistent prefixes, were ruled out as nonsensical. Concerning prefixes
like a = a, we argued that they were not strictly nonsensical but merely redundant.
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“Allowing” the substitution of a name for itself seems to be compatible with any
“mode of signifying” whatsoever, so that Fab∧a = a should have the same translation
as Fab. We now also argue that an inconsistent prefix governing a single disjunct, as for
example in Fab∨Gab∧¬a = a, doesn’t affect other disjuncts and should be treated as
a disjunct incompatible with any CC, leading to the elimination of the disjunct. Finally,
concerning (1), we argue that a formula containing a disjunct with empty matrix such
as Fab∨a = b is not nonsensical per se, but only relative to a given CC consistent with
the matrix-less prefix. Disambiguating the formula according to the CC ¬a = b we
simply eliminate the second disjunct on the ground of its prefix being inconsistent with
the CC. On this view, Fab ∨a = b would receive the same translation as the formula
Fab∧¬a = b.
Concerning condition (3), we see that formulas like Fab∧c = d have both a matrix
and a consistent prefix, butmatrix andprefixbypass eachother.Weargue thatFab∧c=
d is analogous to ∃xφ where x has no free occurrence in φ. Depending on the way the
syntax is set up, such cases may either be rejected as ill-formed or else the semantics
should make clear that the quantifier contributes nothing to the truth-conditions of
the formula and could be eliminated without loss. In fact, we can convince ourselves
that something like the latter is the case for Fab∧c = d by the following consideration:
In what way could the identity c = d become relevant for the translation of the matrix
Fab? For each of the names c and d there are two possibilities: Either it co-refers
with one or both names in the matrix—then it could be substituted for that name,
but we could also express the same meaning by leaving the original name in place;
or its reference is different from both names in the matrix—then the name doesn’t
occur in any matrix and is irrelevant for translating the formula. The same reasoning
can be applied to convince ourselves that c = d is irrelevant for translating the first
disjunct in Fab ∨ c = d , but here the additional question arises whether this formula
should count as a pseudo-proposition. Relative to a hypothetical CC in which c and
d co-refer, it should indeed. But for any such CC there is another CC differing from
the first one only with respect to c and d having different reference. Disambiguation
according to this second CC will eliminate the deviant disjunct, leaving only the first
disjunct Fab for translation. We therefore propose to eliminate all prefixes containing
names not occurring in any matrix. In the case of Fab ∨ c = d this leads to the
elimination of the second disjunct. Thus, according to this argument, Fab ∧ c = d
and Fab ∨ c = d are equivalent to Fab with respect to their translation into exclusive
notation.
As it turns out, there is little to distinguish DPMFs in which conditions (1)–(3) are
relaxed in the way just described from ordinary disjunctive normal forms of quantifier-
free logic. One major conceptual difference between DPMFs and disjunctive normal
forms (DNFs) is that the former are guaranteed to have at least one possible translation
into exclusive notation, while DNFs may also be pseudo-propositions not translatable
at all. Here is the algorithm for generating the DD for a DNF:
1. Eliminate all prefixes or elements of prefixes containing names not occurring in
any matrix.
2. If any disjuncts remain, generate the set of canonical conjunctions expressing
all possible partitions of the set of names occurring in any matrix.
3. For each CC in the set that is consistent with the prefix of at least one disjunct
in the DNF:
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(a) if any of these disjuncts with a prefix consistent with the CC has no
matrix, there is no possible translation according to this CC;
(b) if all prefixes consistent with the CC have matrices we generate one
disjunct of the DD by:
(i) Forming the disjunction of all matrices of the DNF whose prefix
is consistent with the CC.
(ii) Conjoining the CC as prefix to this disjunction.
If no DD is generated, the formula is a nonsensical pseudo-proposition. A disjunct
consisting only of a redundant prefix by itself, for example, will be consistent with
any CC and therefore any formula containing it will not yield any translations. A
disjunct containing a contradictory prefix will be inconsistent with any CC and not
yield any translation for that disjunct. If a disjunct consists only of identities containing
names not occurring in any matrix, elimination of the prefix will eliminate the whole
disjunct.
Concerning the definition of logical equivalence given in §4.7 we may wonder
whether it is extendable to pseudo-propositions. A simple consideration shows that
it is. We have to distinguish two cases: If the algorithm generates a DD, the definition
clearly applies. If the algorithm generates no DD, thus revealing the formula to be a
pseudo-proposition, the definition also applies because for every disjunct of the DD
(namely, none) there is an equivalent translation (and vice versa). The algorithm for
disjunctive normal forms therefore performs a double function: it disambiguates a
formula insofar it is meaningful (i.e., not nonsensical), but it may also reveal a formula
itself or aspects of it (as in Fab∨a = b) to be nonsensical.
Given a translation procedure for disjunctive normal forms, extending the account
to arbitrary formulas of quantifier-free logic may seem easy. After all, any formula
of quantifier-free logic has an equivalent disjunctive normal form. However, as we
have seen in §5, equivalence transformations considered valid in classical logic are
put in doubt by Wittgenstein’s account of the role of identity statements. Tautology
introduction, for example, is an equivalence transformation of classical logic that
allows us to go from a = b to (Fab∨¬Fab)∧a = b. But the first formula is considered
nonsensical by our account while the second is translated as a tautology. Therefore,
tautology introduction is not an equivalence transformation from the standpoint of
exclusive logic. Before extending our account to arbitrary formulas of quantifier-
free logic we would have to make sure that none of the equivalence transformations
needed to transform an arbitrary formula into disjunctive normal form changes the
exclusive translation of the formula. These are: definition of operators in terms of
disjunction, conjunction and negation, De Morgan’s laws and distributive laws. If we
assume these to be unproblematic, full generality of the algorithm could be achieved
by transforming any formula into disjunctive normal form and then applying the
algorithm.26
This concludes our treatment of Wittgenstein’s elimination of identity for
quantifier-free logic. The next step in the development of exclusive logic would be
26 There is, in fact, an argument supporting this assumption based on a kind of four-valued
logic. Unfortunately, considerations of space preclude us from presenting it here.
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to extend our treatment to quantified logic, but since this leads to a host of further
difficult problems, we reserve this step for a different occasion.
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